We study implications of loan securitization through collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) on banks' role as monitors in corporate lending. We find support for less monitoring as a result of banks' access to structured credit markets. We show that risk increased more after borrowing from these banks. Although traditional bank loans are viewed favorably in the bond market, loans from CDO banks are not, indicating that bondholders anticipate less benefit from these banks. On the mean effect, we do not find evidence of underperformance of these firms. The results are consistent with a risk-shifting argument that borrowers shift to riskier and good projects in the interest of shareholders when dealing with easy creditors. Based on past lending relationships, our evidence also points to a lax screening effect which led borrowers to switch to CDO banks to take on more risk. These findings establish a link between the source of credit and banks' monitoring role. They also have important implications for regulators in making policies regarding banks and structured credit markets.
Introduction
Bank loans are considered a special source of financing for businesses. Bank lending involves greater monitoring, and bank loan contracts are easier to renegotiate compared to public debt contracts. However, recent developments in structured credit markets, particularly the growth of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) substantially changed the traditional model of bank lending. CLOs pool portfolios consisting of hundreds of loans, restructure the cash flow, and sell claims in different classes to a wide range of investors, including non-bank institutional investors which generally do not participate in corporate lending directly. This innovation creates additional demand for corporate loans from non-bank investors that cannot be generated from loan sales or loan syndication within the banking system. The new demand creates incentives for banks to originate loans with the purpose of distributing them to securitization vehicles. This new incentive for lending challenges the foundation of the special information role that banks play.
The size of the CLO market grew substantially before the crisis and hence might have important impact on banks' leveraged lending decisions. From 2004 to 2007, the CLO issuance volume increased from $45 billion to $175 billion (Figure 1 ). During the same time, volumes of leveraged loans increased from $480 billion to $689 billion. CLOs were a primary driver for the growth of the leveraged loan market by providing funding for these loans (Shivdasani and Wang (2010) , Ivashina and Sun (2010) ). The demand from CLO vehicles led banks to increasingly originate loans on the purpose of distributing to these vehicles instead of funding these loans on their balance sheets.
When a bank expects to fund a loan primarily from CLOs, the bank has less incentive to produce information about the borrower. This is for two reasons. First, the bank may hold a much smaller fraction of the loan, if any, on its book and sell a large fraction to CLOs 1 1 Some lead arranging banks allocate almost all the amount of their loans and hold a small fraction on their trading desk for trading with clients, according to S&P (2007). . It is important to note here that most CLOs are managed by non-bank institutions and the bank does not usually hold equity tranche in these CLOs. The small exposure to the risk of the loans as a result may not justify the cost of screening and monitoring. Second, CLO vehicles which purchase and fund the loan demand less information, compared to other types of loan purchasers in the secondary loan market, because they hold a diversified portfolio, typically consisting of hundreds of loans. Any individual loan has limited impact on the portfolio performance. Formally, DeMarzo (2005) shows that pooling and tranching destructs private information and make it less valuable in the process of securitization.
To understand if loan securitization changed banks' special role as financial intermediation, we analyze 1865 leveraged loans borrowed by 749 firms during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . We focus on leveraged loans because CLOs purchase predominately leveraged loans but almost never invest in investment-grade loans. We identify loans granted by banks actively engaged in CDO underwriting, and compare to leveraged loans from non-CDO-active banks. A bank's CDO underwriting size indicates its access to the CDO capital and hence the ability to distribute loans to securitization vehicles. This strategy of classifying CDO-induced loans is used in both of Shivdasani and Wang (2010) and Nadauld and Weisbach (2010) .
If hard information is easier to transmit in securitization, we would expect that CDO active banks are more likely to extend credit to borrowers with better observable characteristics. Indeed, we find that borrowers of CDO-active banks are larger, perform better, less levered, and have lower risk before the loan origination, perhaps because this type of borrowers are more marketable to securitization vehicles. However, the better characteristics of these borrowers do not necessarily mean that CDO banks continue to screen their borrowers carefully. This is because bank monitoring is about producing private information not observed in historical financial data or stock prices.
To see if structured credit is associated with risky lending practice, we adopt a few steps to examine ex post use of the fund, the performance and risk of firms which borrowed from CDO banks. We first analyze the changes in leverage and investment after borrowing. Interestingly, CDO-active banks allowed their borrowers to lever up more substantially than non-CDO-active banks. Moreover, this increase in leverage is permanent for CDO bank borrowers (up to three years after borrowing). The different patterns in leverage are consistent with higher risk associated with structured lending by CDO banks. On the asset side of borrowers' balance sheet, we find that the credit from CDO banks seems to be largely invested in mergers and acquisitions but not in CAPEX or R&D investment.
If less bank monitoring led bad loans to be granted by banks with access to the new funding from structured credit markets, then we would expect the mergers funded by the loans to be bad.
Our second step is to examine the impact on performance. Generally, our evidence does not support that bad investment projects are funded by the credit from CDO banks. The mergers funded by these banks do not perform worse than those funded by non-CDO banks, with performance measured by acquirer's cumulative abnormal returns. In short windows, the CDO bank funded mergers seem to generate even higher abnormal return for shareholders of the borrowers. We also analyze accounting performance of the borrowers and find little evidence of underperformance associated with funding by CDO active banks.
Our third step is to examine potential risk-shifting of borrowers facing easy banks.
Shareholders take upside gains from risky projects and debt holders bear the downside costs. This conflict between shareholders and debt holders is a primary reason for banks to monitor. Banks' information production is beneficial for public bond holders and hence loan announcement is associated with positive abnormal return on bonds. Therefore, when a lending bank devotes less effort in monitoring, we would expect bond holders to enjoy less benefit from banks' information role. This is what we find. The announcement of a loan from a CDO bank does not generate any positive abnormal return for bondholders, in contrast to positive abnormal return observed on loan from a non-CDO bank. The different reaction in bond markets is robust to various loan characteristics controls that may affect the distribution of cash flows among creditors. It seems that wealth is transferred from bondholders to stockholders by borrowing from CDO active banks, particularly considering the positive acquirer abnormal return in mergers funded by the bank credit. It is consistent with a risk-shifting argument, where borrowers invest in riskier projects in favor of shareholders when banks are easy on them.
To further examine risk-shifting behavior of borrowers, we then directly measure and compare ex post risk measures for the two sets of borrowers. We first examine stock return volatility and idiosyncratic risk and find that both measures increase more after borrowing from CDO banks than from non-CDO banks. This difference in the increase in volatility is highly significant over long term even controlling for other characteristics at the time of borrowing. One may argue that this more increase in stock market volatility can be a leverage effect, as leverage increased more for CDO bank borrowers. To adjust for the leverage effect, we calculate asset volatility and distance-to-default following Merton/KMV model and construct monthly measure of default risk for our borrowers around loan originations. We then conduct a dif-in-dif analysis and show that compared to non-CDO bank borrowers, firms funded by CDO banks experience a significant increase in asset volatility and significant decrease in distance-to-default, controlling for loan fixed-effects. This result is also robust to contemporaneous market volatility. Overall, the result on ex post risk measures provides further evidence that banks' structured lending is associated with risky investment choices of borrowers.
The increase in risk observed for firms funded by CDO bank can be due to either lax screening at loan origination or less monitoring after it. If a bank does not screen borrowers as carefully as it used to, risky firms may self select to borrow from the bank. Alternatively, if the bank invests less watching the borrower after careful screening at the origination, the firm may switch to riskier projects in favor of its shareholders. We cannot separate the selection from treatment effect completely in our setting. However, we find that after controlling for a firm fixed effect, borrowing from CDO banks is still associated with higher risk for the same firm. This suggests that the difference in risk measures is not driven by a riskier pool of borrowers. Hence, the higher risk can either be a treatment effect from less bank monitoring or a self-selection to CDO banks of borrowers which anticipate an increase in their risk levels. We further provide evidence supporting the latter argument. We show that firms switching from other banks to the current CDO bank increase their risk more than borrowers that already have a lending relationship with their current CDO bank. This result is consistent with a screening argument that firms switch to CDO banks so that they can make risky investments that may not be approved by traditional banks.
Our work has important implications on the literature of corporate finance and banking. First, to the best of our knowledge, we provide the first evidence on the impact of securitization on banks' role as monitors in corporate lending. Our results suggest that the monitoring incentive is associated with banks' funding models. Gande and Saunders (2009) analyze this special role of banks in presence of the secondary loan market and find that banks continue to produce information given loan sales. We find different results for loan securitization, perhaps because banks are reluctant to collect private information in our setting as it is hard to be transmitted in securitization (DeMarzo (2005) ). The results can be useful for regulators and policy-makers currently debating about the nature of regulation of structured credit markets.
Second, we contribute to a bourgeoning literature on the consequences of recent growth in securitization and structured credit markets. Many studies show that securitization led to lax screening in mortgage lending, contributing to higher default in mortgage and particularly subprime in the recent years (e.g., Keys et al. (2009), Mian and Sufi (2009) ). Hence, securitization seems to be essential to the cause of the recent financial crisis. However, there is no evidence that securitization led to underperformance in corporate loans (Shivdasani and Wang (2010), Benmelch et al. (2010) ). The different results from mortgage and corporate loan market are puzzling. Our analysis fills the gap by showing that risky projects gets funded by the CDO capital, but these are not bad projects perhaps because of other mechanisms at work in corporations but not in households that disencourage managers from investing in bad projects.
Third, we contribute to the literature that examines the supply-side effects on financing and investment decisions. Shivdasani and Wang (2010) show that the growth in CDO markets contributed to the large volumes observed in the LBO market during 2004 -2007 . Nadauld and Weisbach (2010 show that securitization through CDOs lowered costs of credit for borrowers.
Different from these studies, our analysis provides specific evidence on ex post investment choices and the risk levels as a result of the new source of capital.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the institutional and theoretical background of our study. Section II describes our data and sample. We examine the mean effect of CDOinduced lending on borrowers in Section III and the variance effect in Section IV, respectively. Section V concludes.
I. Background

A. Institutional loans, loan securitization and structured lending model
An important development of the syndicated loan market in the last decade has been the increasing participation of institutional investors. Perhaps because of their higher risk appetite, institutional investors predominately participate in the leveraged loan market, contributing to the fast growth of total issuance volumes of leveraged loans since 2000. To see why CLOs can change banks' incentives beyond what traditional securitization may do, it is important to note the difference between the newly developed CLO market and traditional bank securitization. Banks commonly hold equity tranche to align incentives in the old fashioned securitization. However, the majority of the recent CLOs are issued and managed by non-bank institutional investors, such as asset management firms, hedge funds and private equity funds. It is not as common for banks who sell the loans to hold equity tranches of these issued
CLOs. The process of CLO issues is as follows. The CLO manager, commonly asset managers, set a special purpose entity (SPE). The SPE then purchases corporate loans, typically leveraged loans from the primary and secondary loan markets. Loan originating banks sell their loans in pieces to these SPE. In addition, many of the large banks and investment banks underwrite CLOs for these managers and also commonly invest in senior tranches of these issues. In this process, If private information is less valuable in loan securitization, an originating bank is expected to put less effort to collect private information when it expects to sell the loan to securitization vehicles. As a result, firms that were not able to borrow from banks can now access bank credit.
Alternatively, firms may be able to borrow more than they used to. After loan origination, if a bank does not watch its borrower closely, the manager of the firm may invest the bank credit in risky project, to maximize the value of its shareholders. However, it is not clear whether the less monitoring has a negative impact on the borrowers. If the monitoring at traditional banks is optimal, then securitization is expected to lead to suboptimal investment. However, traditional banks, facing high costs of capital from deposit, may ration credit, leaving positive NPV projects unfunded. As conservative debt investors, they might over monitor borrowers by forcing them to forego risky but NPV positive projects. For example, Roberts and Sufi (2009) show that violation of covenant has a negative effect on access to credit, particularly for those who have limited access to alternative source of financing. The leveraged borrowers we examine in this paper are likely to be heavily monitored given the high level of risk. Therefore, less monitoring of lenders may not necessarily be bad for these firms and may allow good but risky project to be taken.
II. Data and Sample
We construct our loan sample from DealScan. This database is widely used in many other studies and detailed description of the database can be found in Chava and Roberts (2008) . We Third, we have at least two years after loan origination to examine the use of fund and risk characteristics after borrowing. Information on lead banks' CDO underwriting activities is obtained from ABS database, which covers all rated securitized issues by non-government agencies in the world. We describe the data in more details below.
A. The Loan Sample
Among loans in DealScan, we restrict to leveraged loans and with at least one institutional tranche. This is because CLOs almost exclusively invest in leveraged loans by purchasing institutional tranches. CLO-induced lending should have institutional tranches to distribute these loans to CLO vehicles. Hence, loans with only revolvers and term loan A tranches are excluded from our sample. For the rest of loans with institutional tranches, we collect information on the complete tranche structure from DealScan. It records characteristics of loans at the tranche level, including revolvers, bank term loans (i.e., term loan A) and institutional term loans (identified as term loan "B" through "H"). We exclude tranches recorded as other instruments (e.g. leases, notes, bridge loans, bankers' acceptances, etc.). We also exclude all finance or utility borrowers as their financial ratios should be interpreted differently, and exclude LBO loans to ensure postloan data.
The borrowers in DealScan loan sample are then matched with Compustat using the link file provided by Michael Roberts to obtain financial information on borrowers.
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B. Banks' CDO/CLO Size
We are able to identify 1825 loans representing 749 firms in Compustat. We then match the sample firms to CRSP for analysis involving stock returns and to TRACE for analysis on bond returns. In addition, we extract mergers in which these borrowers acquired other firms from SDC platinum.
Banks' CDO/CLO underwriting activity is contained in the ABS database from Asset-Backed
Alert. The ABS database presents the initial terms and origination information of all rated assetbacked issues, mortgage-backed issues and collateralized debt obligations placed around the world. It identifies the primary participants in each transaction, including underwriting banks in each issue. Shivdasani and Wang (2010) provide further details of this database.
We use a bank's CDO underwriting size as an indicator of its access to the CDO capital because the bank gains relationship with CDO managers through underwriting. These CDO managers can be potential buyers of the loans arranged by the bank either as a syndicate member or in the secondary market. The bank gains better assessment of the CDO market and better access to the capital from its underwriting experience and relationship with CDO managers. We use total underwriting amounts of all types of CDOs (not restricted to CLOs only) to capture banks' access the structured credit. This is because a CDO manager can manage various types of CDOs. For example, a bank may build relationship with a CDO manager from underwriting structured product CDOs and this relationship can be helpful for the bank to distribute loans in the future to CLOs managed by this manager.
We construct an indicator of banks' access to the CDO capital. We start with a lead bank panel containing all lead bank-years from our sample loans, match these lead arrangers to CDO underwriters in the ABS database, and then calculate annual CDO underwriting amount for each of the bank-years. If a bank does not underwrite any CDO in a year when it lends, the CDO underwriting amount is assigned value of zero. This gives us a panel of bank-years with CDO underwriting amount. We then construct a bank CDO dummy, which takes value of 1 when the CDO underwriting amount of the bank in the year is above the median CDO underwriting across all bank-years. Since the CDO bank dummy is defined at the bank-year level, some banks can be a CDO bank in a year and a non-CDO bank in another.
Based on the lead bank's CDO activities in the year when the loan is arranged, we then label a loan as a CDO loan if at least one of the lead arrangers is a CDO bank (with CDO bank dummy equal to 1) in the year of the loan active date and a non-CDO loan if none of the lead arranger is a CDO bank. Much of the analysis is to compare CDO loans to non-CDO loans. We understand this classification is not perfect. Our purpose is to capture loans that are arranged only because of the presence of the CDO funding channel. By including all leveraged loans arranged by large CDO banks as CDO loans, we may have misclassified loans that a bank would have arranged even without the CDO market as CDO loans. However, this would only make it harder to find any difference between the two groups and hence should not change our inference on most of the results. Within a loan, term loan B accounted for 44% (the same for the median) in non-CDO loans and 63% (72% for the median) in CDO loans. As expected, pro rata tranches, both revolvers and term loan A, are less important in non-CDO loans than in CDO loans. Overall, from CDO banks, firms were able to borrow larger loans, particularly in the institutional market, consistent with the findings that the growth of the CLO market has expanded credit to corporate borrowers.
C. Description of the Loan Sample
The lower rows of Table 1 show that CDO loans have longer maturity, loose financial covenants, and slightly worse rating, suggesting easy credit offered by CDO banks5 level seems to indicate that the CDO banks offered easy credit and allocate more of it to CLOs and other institutional investors.
III. Borrowers of CDO Banks and the Mean Effect
Our null hypothesis is that securitization leads banks to invest less in producing information about borrowers. This less monitoring should be reflected in increase in risk of borrowers ex post.
If bad projects get funded through the structured credit, we should observe bad performance as a result. In this section, we first examine ex ante characteristics of firms funded by CDO banks. We then identify how the bank credit is used and the subsequent performance ex post. Table 2 compares characteristics of borrowers of CDO loans to those of non-CDO loans.
A. Ex Ante Characteristics of Borrowers
Borrowers of CDO banks are much larger than those of non-CDO banks. For example, average total asset of these borrowers is $3 billion (median $1.3 billion), compared to $1.7 billion (median $0.7 billion) for borrowers of non-CDO banks. Borrowers of CDO banks also perform slightly better in the year before the loan origination. They are less levered, and have better investment opportunity as measured by M/B ratio. But they have less tangible assets, indicating it may be harder for these firms to get a loan. They on average have slightly worse rating, although the median rating is the same for the two subsamples. With various risk measures, borrowers of CDO banks are less risky. For example, ROA growth volatility over the past five years is 0.382 (median 0.279) for borrowers of CDO banks and 0.426 (median 0.323) for those of non-CDO banks. Similar result is found using market measures of risk. Idiosyncratic risk of CDO bank borrowers is at 2.5 (median 2.2) compared to 3.9 (median 3.2) for non-CDO bank borrowers.
Overall, ex ante characteristics do not suggest that CDO banks extend credit to bad firms or risky borrowers. However, the observable characteristics of borrowers may not capture banks' effort in producing private information because by definition private information is not observable and not reflected in historical financial reports or stock prices. On the contrary, the favorable characteristics of these borrowers are consistent with the intention for banks to securitize these loans. In securitization, hard information is more important than soft information as it can be easily communicated in complicated pricing models. Anticipating sales to securitization vehicles, banks, hence, are more willing to originate loans with good characteristics that can be modeled favorably. They have less incentive to produce private information as this type of information is typically soft and difficult to be transmitted in the securitization process.
Therefore, the ex ante characteristics does not indicate the quality of lending. Given the unobservable nature of private information, we need to examine ex post behavior of these borrowers to identify any effect from lax screening or loose monitoring. Table 3 presents the changes in major financial characteristics after borrowing for CDO loans and non-CDO loans separately. Each column for the two subsamples represents the changes in the first, second, and third year after the loan effective date relative to the year preceding it.
B. Ex Post Use of the Bank Credit and Performance
Definitions of the financial variables can be found in the Appendix. Apparently, a new bank loan changes both the liability and asset sides of the borrower's balance sheet. On the liability side, leverage increased as a result of the new loan. Table 3 shows that credit from CDO banks is associated with an increase of 3% in book leverage and the increase is highly significant.
However, such an immediate impact is not observed for non-CDO bank borrowers, which only experience a modest increase of 1.6% in leverage and this increase is statistically indistinguishable from zero. More interestingly, the increase in leverage for CDO borrowers seems to be persistent. While non-CDO bank borrowers reduce their leverage by 4.4% in another two years, the leverage of CDO bank borrowers stays at the similar level to the first year. The difference of the change in leverage is highly significantly different across the two subsamples. Figure 2 shows an even more striking difference in leverage when using quarterly data. The credit from CDO banks is granted on top of an increase in leverage in the quarter before the loan become active. In two quarters, leverage increased by 6% and stayed at levels above 50% for the next three years. This pattern is in sharp contrast to leverage reversal observed on credit from non-CDO banks. These firms lower their leverage to before-borrowing level in one year and further in the next two years. This distinct pattern of leverage seems to suggest that CDO banks tolerate aggressive increase in leverage. In addition, the different pattern in leverage cannot be explained by financial characteristics at the time of borrowing. Table 4 shows the regressions of changes in financial variables after borrowing on characteristics at the time of borrowing. Models
(1), (2), and (3) show that the resulting increase in leverage is significantly higher for CDO loans and this increase is persistent for these loans, even controlling for other financial characteristics at the time of borrowing that may explain the change in leverage.
This substantial and permanent increase in leverage is consistent with the argument that CDO banks lend more aggressively and tolerate higher risk. In addition, it is perhaps related to different payment schedule of institutional term loans. While pro rata term loans are repaid with equal installment over the life of loans, institutional term loans are commonly loaded with little repayment in early life but heavy payment towards the end. Funded more by institutional investors, loans granted by CDO banks require small or littler repayment in early years. As a result, leverage stays at high levels. This is assuring that our classification of CDO-backed loans capture the funding from institutional investors.
On the asset side, the bank credit is largely reflected in mergers and acquisitions but not much in CAPEX and R&D investment. Merger spending increased by 5% (of assets) in CDO-funded firms in the first year and by 2% in non-CDO-funded borrowers. The changes are statistically significant in both subsamples. But this seems to be a short-term effect of bank loans as M&A spending dropped in both samples in the second year after borrowing. Nevertheless, M&A seems to be the major use of the bank credit as we do not observe similar increase in other types of investment right after borrowing. In addition, CDO banks seem to fund larger or more merger deals because the increase in merger spending is significantly higher for CDO-backed borrowers in the first year after borrowing. Model (5) confirms this difference across the two sets of borrowers to be significantly different in a multivariate setting. The merger effect only presents in the year right after borrowing and CDO-funded firms do not engage in more mergers beyond the year when they are granted with the bank credit. Model (6) of Table 4 shows that CDO-funded firms do not engage in more mergers in the second years. We also test the difference in CAPEX and R&D in the multivariate setting. Consistent with the univariate results, we do not find a significant difference in these types of investment across the two groups of firms. To save space, we only report one specification in model (4) of Table 4 .
How did the investment perform? We examine the answer to this question with both accounting measures and stock market valuation. Both sets of firms see a drop in ROA right after the borrowing, but the difference across the two types of firms is not significant. Moreover, ROA seems to recover a year later. There is some evidence that CDO-funded firms perform worse in the third year than their non-CDO counterparties. However, this difference is not statistically significant after controlling for other financial characteristics. This result is consistent with Benmelch et al. (2010) who find that securitized loans do not perform worse than loans not securitized.
The earlier analysis suggests that a major use of the bank credit is to fund mergers. We hence download mergers in which our sample firms acquire other firms within one year of borrowing (either before one year or after one year) from SDC platinum. These mergers are likely to be funded by the bank loan captured in our sample. If CDO banks fund bad merger deals, we would expect to see a negative reaction in the stock market with negative cumulate acquirer abnormal return. We are able to identify 358 mergers funded by CDO banks and 307 mergers by non-CDO banks. and growth opportunities (measured by M-B ratio) and this difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. This effect is also robust to industry fixed effect, included in model (2). But it is much weaker over 5-days window (model (3) and (4)) and not significant at all over 7-days window (model (5) and (6)).
Overall, based on both accounting measures and market assessment of performance, we do not find much indication that CDO banks fund bad projects or projects that destroy value. Instead, the evidence seems to suggest that the mergers these banks fund generate higher abnormal return for shareholders, at least in a short window. However, better stock performance does not mean that CDO banks continue to monitor their borrowers because shareholders and creditors may have conflicting interest. Less monitoring of banks may lead to risk-shifting behavior of borrowers and create value for shareholders at the costs of creditors. The next section examines this possibility.
IV. Risk Shifting of Borrowers of CDO Banks
We first examine bondholders' reaction to the announcement of loans from CDO banks and from non-CDO banks to see if there is any wealth transfer between creditors and shareholders and how this has changed. We then focus on risk measures to identify the change in risk subsequent to borrowing from CDO banks. To shed some light on monitoring effect versus screening effect, we examine borrowers who switch to a CDO bank which they do not have a relationship with previously.
A. Bond Market Reactions to Loan Announcement
Banks' monitoring is beneficial to bondholders as it helps to reduce conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors by protecting creditors. If banks do not monitor their borrowers closely after gaining access to the CDO capital, then firms can shift to riskier projects, which generate value for shareholders on the upside but hurt creditors on the downside. In this case, bondholders are not able to free ride on banks' monitoring and their interests are left unprotected. Hence, if CDO banks put less effort in monitoring than non-CDO banks, we would expect a different reaction of bondholders to the loan announcement.
To test this, we match our sample of borrowers to TRACE to obtain price data on bonds traded on these borrowers. We are able to find 998 outstanding bonds traded around the To avoid biases from other events during a long window, the observations with more than 30 days between the two prices are eliminated. We calculate bond CAR by subtracting cumulate return of 10-year government bond during the same window from bond returns. To avoid overweighting on borrowers with more bonds, we then take average of CAR of multiple bonds traded on a single borrower. This gives us one observation for each loan in our sample. Table 6 reports the results. Panel A shows that announcement of loans from non-CDO banks is associated with a positive CAR of 0.53% at the mean and 0.37% at the median. Both are statistically significant at least at the 5% level. In contrast, we do not find such a positive reaction to loans granted by CDO banks. The last two columns test the difference in the mean and median of CAR across the two subsamples and show that CAR is significantly lower on bonds traded on CDO bank borrowers than on non-CDO bank borrowers (at the 1% level both at the mean and median). This result suggests that bondholders perceive different information role of CDO banks and non-CDO banks, consistent with the view that banks less involved in monitoring when they can securitize the loans. Related to our findings, Gande and Saunders (2009) show negative bond market reaction on the first day when a bank loan is traded in the secondary market.
Panel B confirms the result in a multivariate setting where bond CAR is regressed on the CDO dummy. By clustering at the firm level, model (1) shows that the different bond CAR for the two types of borrowers is robust to adjusting standard errors for firms that borrowed multiple loans. Models (2) and (3) confirm that the result continues to hold if we control for loan characteristics that may affect the cash flow of bondholders differently. The CDO dummy is associated with lower CAR and it is statistically significant at the 10% level.
Overall, the reaction in the bond market seems to suggest that bondholders benefit less from CDO banks than from non-CDO banks. This is consistent with the view that banks invest less in producing information to monitor borrowers when they can fund the loan from CLO vehicles.
B. The Changes in Risk
If the structured lending is associated with risk shifting of borrowers, we should observe increase in risk ex post. To measure risk, we calculate borrowers' stock return volatility and idiosyncratic risk from one year before the loan to three years after. The lower part of Table 3 shows that both stock return volatility and idiosyncratic risk decreased after borrowing from non-CDO banks. This decrease is highly significant over two-and three-year horizon. In contrast, borrowing from CDO banks is generally associated with an increase in the mean of the two risk measures. This increase is statistically significant in two years and three years, probably indicating that it takes some time for the risk to be taken and perceived by the stock market.
Consistently, two-sample test on the difference in the changes over the two types of borrowers are statistically significant at the 1% level over two-or three-year horizon. Models (7)- (9) of Table 4 confirm this result for idiosyncratic risk in a multivariate setting where other financial characteristics at the time of the borrower is controlled for and standard errors are adjusted by clustering at the borrower level. We find similar results for stock return volatility but are not reported to save space.
Since both stock return volatility and idiosyncratic risk are affected by leverage, the increase in these two measures might be simply driven by the increase in leverage we show earlier for borrowers from CDO banks. To adjust for the leverage effect, we calculate asset volatility (AV) and distance-to-default (DTD) following Merton/KMV model. The model is described in detail in the Appendix.
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The last two rows in Table 3 formally test the changes in DTD and AV. Annual DTD and AV are calculated by taking average of the monthly numbers. The result confirms that the difference in changes in the two measures is statistically significant at the 1% level for all the three years across the two subsamples. Consistent with Figure 3 , in the non-CDO subsample, AV decreases and DTD increases after borrowing. Both changes are significant at the 1% level in the second and third year. In contrast, the CDO-funded firms experience an increase in AV and decrease in DTD. Both changes are largely significant in the first year and third year after the borrowing.
We use quarterly data of leverage and daily stock return in the past year to calculate AV and DTD in monthly frequency from one year before the loan announcement to three years after. Figure 3 shows the average of AV and DTD for the two groups of borrowers.
Panel A shows that non-CDO bank borrowers have much higher default probability before borrowing but the difference diminishes after. Specifically, these firms see their DTD increase steadily from 1.5 to 1.7 in one year after borrowing and above 2 in two years. In contrast, CDO bank borrowers see their DTD drop from 2.5 to 2.3 in the month of the borrowing. It stays steady right after but further drops in three years. Panel B on asset volatility demonstrates the similar pattern with asset volatility.
Since these AV and DTD adjust for leverage effect, the evidence suggests that firms engage in real activities that are riskier, consistent with the risk-shifting view.
One concern over the univariate analysis is that the increase in asset volatility might be driven by the overall increase in market volatility during the financial crisis. This is relevant because more CDO loans than non-CDO loans were arranged towards the end of the sample, which is followed by a period of very volatile market during the recent financial crisis. The asset volatility of these firms after borrowing can be inflated because of abnormally high stock volatility in the overall market but not related to investment choices made by the firms. In order to control for this effect of market volatility, we conduct a difference-in-difference test in a loan level fixed effect regression setting, which allows us to control for contemporaneous market volatility. In particular, we take the monthly panel data of AV and DTD around the loan announcement date for each borrower and regress DTD and AV on a dummy indicating whether the month of observation is after the borrowing (POST) and an interaction term of POST and the CDO dummy, controlling for loan fixed effects. We report the result in Table 7 . Models (1) and (3) are standard dif-in-dif test and confirm that DTD decreases and AV increases after loan origination only for CDO-funded borrowers. The coefficient on the interaction term (CDO*POST) is significant at the 1% level in both models. In contrast, the coefficient on the POST dummy is positive in the regression of DTD, indicating that DTD decreases for non-CDO bank borrowers. Consistent pattern is shown for AV in model (3).
To control for market volatility, we include the volatility of equal-weighted market daily return in the past year at the end of the month of observation as a control variable. Models (2) and (4) report the results. Indeed, market volatility is very significant and improves the model substantially. But the signs on the interaction term and the POST dummy remain unchanged and the effects are still significant at the 1% level. Models (7) and (8) in Table 7 show that default probability does not increase in absolute terms for the CDO loans. But non-CDO bank borrowers experience a decrease in default probability and hence CDO bank borrowers become riskier in relative terms.
In sum, the result on ex post risk measures after borrowing further suggests that a firm involves in riskier projects after borrowing from a CDO bank, supporting the risk-shifting consequences of corporate lending funded by structured credit.
C. Is It a Screening or Monitoring Effect?
The risk-shifting of borrowers likely funded by structured credit can be due to either lax screening or less monitoring. If CDO banks have less incentive to screen borrowers when expect to fund the loans by structured credit, riskier borrowers may self select to borrow from these banks. The increased risk profile observed on CDO bank borrowers, hence, is a result of the risky characteristics of these firms that are not captured in observable variables. In other words, banks lend to firms that are naturally riskier when they can fund the loans from CDO markets. We refer to this as "screening" effect. It indicates that the pool of borrowers changes as a result of structured lending. Lax screening has been found as a result of mortgage securitization. For example, Keys et al. (2009) show that conditional on being securitized, subprime mortgages relatively easy to be securitized have worse performance than a similar risk profile group which is less likely to be securitized.
However, the result in mortgages may not be directly applicable on corporate loans. Unlike mortgages, corporate loans are much larger and are not securitized as a whole. Instead, corporate loans are distributed to various investors in syndication and one major type of the investors is securitization vehicles. The syndication process may give incentives for banks to screen borrowers in order to keep the reputation as a good arranger and attract all types of investors, not only securitized vehicles. Hence, the lax screening documented in mortgages may not fully explain our results. On the other hand, the increased risk might be driven by a treatment effect, which suggests that firms take on risky project after borrowing from CDO banks because these banks do not watch out them as closely as they used to. We refer this to as "monitoring" effect because it is a causal effect of loose monitoring after a loan is granted. Monitoring is unique to corporate loans and it is essential to banks' special role in reducing agency costs of shareholders and debt holders. A pure monitoring effect suggests that banks continue to screen and the pool of borrowers does not change, but these firms shift to riskier projects as a result of loose monitoring after they borrower from CDO banks.
Given monitoring is essential to banks' role as financial intermediation, it is important to identify whether the increase in risk is a result of less monitoring or lax screening. However, it is empirically challenging to disentangle a causal relation between the CDO underwriting activities of lead banks and the borrower's risk taking behavior. We do not have data and tools to answer this question conclusively. However, we attempt to run a couple of tests that can indicate the existence of the two effects.
Assume that firms are randomly assigned with unobservable risk levels and that this risk level does not change over time. Then the screening story suggests that risky firms choose to borrow from CDO banks because these banks are easy on them and low risk firms can borrow from both types of firms. The higher risk for the CDO bank borrowers we show is a realization of their higher risk level but not a direct result of borrowing from CDO banks. In other words, when we control for the unobservable risk level, we should not observe any association of CDO bank and the increase in risk levels. With this in mind, we take firms that borrowed multiple loans in our sample and run regressions of ex post changes in risk on the CDO dummy in a firm fixed-effect framework, where the unobservable risk levels can be captured by the firm fixed effect. Table 8 reports the fixed effect regressions of changes in book leverage and idiosyncratic risk in one to three years after the loan become active. Models (1) and (2) show that CDO bank dummy is not significantly associated with greater increase in leverage in the first two years. This is in contrast to the result in models (1) and (2) in Table 4 , suggesting that the increase in leverage is driven by firm characteristics but not the lending banks' CDO activities. But in three years, CDO dummy is still related to higher leverage and this effect is significant at the 5% level.
However, CDO dummy continues to have a positive effect on changes in idiosyncratic risk even in the first two years. This effect is significant at the 10% level in the first year and at the 5% level in the second year (model (4) and (5)). It is much stronger in the third year as shown in model (6). Hence, even controlling for unobservable firm fixed effects, borrowing from CDO banks is still related to higher increase in risk. This result suggests that either the increase in risk we document is driven by less monitoring after borrowing or firms' risk nature changed over time. In addition, the different results on leverage and idiosyncratic risk further confirm that our results on idiosyncratic risk are not solely driven by leverage as we continue to observe significant increase in idiosyncratic risk but not in leverage.
Because firms' risk nature does not necessarily stay constant, as we assumed in the fixed effect analysis, the above result does not necessarily suggest no effect of structured lending on bank screening. The firm fixed effect does not capture an increase in risk levels. Hence, the higher risk after borrowing from CDO bank can still be a self selection effect, which suggests that firms that become riskier choose to borrow from CDO banks. To examine this possibility, we check borrower-bank relationship for our CDO loans. For each loan, we look back to see whether the firm borrowed from the same lead bank before. If not, we classify this borrower as a switcher, indicating that it switched from other banks to this CDO bank. For a switcher, the lead bank's screening function is more relevant because it does not have the information about the borrower before. On the other hand, for firms that borrowed from the same bank before, it is less likely a screening effect because the bank already collected the information about the borrower from early lending.
We use our DTD and AV panel data to analyze the changes in risk for switchers and nonswitchers. We first repeat the loan fixed effect regressions as discussed in section IV. B in the subsamples of CDO loans and non-CDO loans. For CDO-loans, we create a new dummy SWITCH to indicate whether the borrower of the loan has borrowed from the same CDO bank before and we are interested in the interaction term of SWITCH and POST. The results are reported on the right panel of Table 7 . Model (9) shows that after borrowing, DTD dropped more for switchers than for non-switchers, indicating that firms that are new to CDO banks experience a more increase in risk. This effect is significant at the 1% level. Model (10) confirms the higher risk ex post for switchers using asset volatility as the measure. This result is consistent with a lax screening story which argues that firms that become riskier choose to borrow from CDO banks.
However, we cannot rule out causal effect of less monitoring after borrowing with our current tests. Therefore, the evidence seems to suggest that the structured credit available through banks have implications on firms' financing decisions and may lead firms to switch to banks with easy credit.
V. Conclusion
We examine the implications of loan securitization on banks' special role as monitors in corporate lending. We find that credit from CDO banks is associated with a higher ex post increase in borrowers' risk levels, compared to credit granted by non-CDO banks, consistent with the view that banks exert less effort in information production when they have access to securitization markets as a new funding source. This reduced monitoring effort is perceived by bondholders. In contrast to positive abnormal returns from borrowing at a traditional bank, bondholders gain nothing at announcement when the loan is granted by a CDO bank. However, this lower level of monitoring did not lead firms to invest in negative NPV projects as we find no evidence of underperformance. Our results seem to be more consistent with a risk-shifting hypothesis that firms invest in risky but profitable projects in the interest of shareholder but at the cost of creditors when banks devote less resources monitoring them. We also shed some light on whether the increased risk is a result of less screening at loan origination or lower monitoring after it. We find stronger increase in the risk for firms switching from other banks to CDO banks, suggesting that the easy screening at these banks might have allowed potential borrowers to take on more risk by switching from other conservative banks.
Our results suggest that banks become less special when they can fund their loans from securitization markets. Interestingly, we find little negative consequences on value. This probably suggests that monitoring in traditional banks may not necessarily at the optimal level. Monitoring can be costly to borrowers, leading firms to forgo good projects (Chava and Roberts (2008) ).
Hence, the lower monitoring associated with structured lending may not necessarily be less efficient. Considering that structured credit markets improved the access to credit and lower costs of credit for borrowers, loan securitization may be a valuable funding model. Apparently, more research is needed to understand the social welfare of the structured lending model. This will also have important implications on policy-making related to securitization. The ratio of the total amount of institutional terms loans to the total amount of the loan including pro rata tranches Term Loan A Proportion
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